Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: A Troublesome Cooperation?

by Febrica Senia

on Vol. VIII, Issue 3 (June 2014) of Perspectives on Terrorism.

Abstract
The security of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is of great importance for the international seafaring community. As a result, lack of adequate cooperation in this area has raised some concerns over the safety and security of navigation in the waterways. This article focuses on Indonesia and the Philippines role in securing the waters and the behaviour of these two countries when it comes to cooperation. It investigates why they have joined a number of cooperation arrangements while rejecting others. Most scholarly works point at sovereignty concern as the main reason underpinning their decision. Rather than focusing solely on sovereignty infringements, this article argues that Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ decisions towards cooperation initiatives are informed by the calculation of (both the sovereignty and implementation) costs and benefits, and the level of their control over the
cooperation outcomes.

Keywords: Indonesia, the Philippines, maritime terrorism, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas

To see full research, proceed by clicking this link.

Teknologi Informasi Mengawal Bonus Demografi

Oleh: Valerian Timothy

Pada tahun 2020-2035, Indonesia diprediksi akan meraih bonus demografi, yakni populasi usia produktif lebih banyak dari populasi usia nonproduktif. Namun, Indonesia baru bisa mendapatkan bonus demografi jika memiliki penduduk muda yang pintar. Tanpa itu, Indonesia hanya akan mengalami kutukan demografi.

Syarat meraih bonus demografi memang menciptakan kondisi kelompok masyarakat produktif (15-64 tahun) yang kreatif, pintar, dan inovatif sehingga mampu berproduksi secara maksimal.

Pemerintah Indonesia mengimplementasikan syarat ini dengan kebijakan beasiswa LPDP dan Presidential Scholarship untuk mendorong murid-murid Indonesia bersekolah di luar negeri dan berbakti untuk negara setelah lulus.

Menurut laporan UNFPA, sebuah negara yang sedang menuju bonus demografi akan dihadapkan pada risiko kondisi politik yang tidak stabil apabila tidak mampu merespons keinginan kelompok masyarakat miskin mendapatkan kesempatan yang sama dengan kelompok masyarakat kaya.

Tantangan kedua adalah saat mencapai bonus demografi, Indonesia akan mendapatkan pertumbuhan jumlah orang kritis yang sangat tinggi karena semakin banyak lulusan luar negeri yang berkarya di Indonesia.

Pemikiran mereka akan memengaruhi masyarakat sehingga pemerintah perlu menciptakan ekosistem yang cocok agar mereka bisa bekerja dan berkomunikasi dengan pemerintah. Pemerintah juga perlu membuat kebijakan yang bisa merespons masyarakat dengan lebih cepat, efisien, dan akurat. Bagaimana caranya?

Kuasai informasi

Kuncinya adalah menguasai teknologi informasi untuk berinteraksi dengan rakyat. Awal tahun 1997, Indonesia memiliki proyek ”Nusantara 21”, tetapi tujuan utamanya adalah memperkuat Satelit Palapa untuk kepentingan pemerintah.

Proyek ini terkesan kontradiktif dengan ide otonomi daerah waktu itu sehingga proyek ”Nusantara 21” kurang populer dan terhenti ketika terjadi pergantian rezim.

Pada zaman SBY, pemerintah memakai fasilitas UKP4 dan jejaring sosial untuk mendapatkan input dari masyarakat.

Walaupun kebijakan menguasai teknologi informasi semakin berkembang, Presiden SBY belum memiliki arah kebijakan untuk membangun kabel serat optik secara merata di seluruh Indonesia, juga perangkat keras dan lunak, untuk mengembangkan teknologi informasi.

Berdasarkan perspektif cybersuperiority, kedua perangkat (kabel serat optik dan software-hardware computer) sangat penting seperti halnya satelit untuk memperkuat keamanan, ekonomi, dan kebudayaan Indonesia.

Kita sudah melihat bukti, tidak kuatnya infrastruktur kabel serat optik, satelit, dan komputer di Indonesia membuat negara lain mampu menyadap Pemerintahan Indonesia lewat Satelit Palapa.

Pada era Orde Baru, peluncuran proyek ”Nusantara 21” dilakukan untuk menyebarkan nilai-nilai pemersatuan Nusantara sebagai negara kepulauan. Kebijakan yang diperkuat dengan Keppres No 30 Tahun 1997 ini dikoordinasikan oleh Tim Koordinasi Telematika Indonesia untuk pemutakhiran proyek Palapa.

Namun, pemutakhiran satelit saja tidak cukup. Pada abad ke-21, satelit bukan lagi satu-satunya infrastruktur superhighway informasi yang penting. Kabel serat optik dan perangkat lunak dan keras komputer itu juga menjadi penting.

Tulisan Eom Jeung Ho tentang cybersuperiority mengatakan bahwa sebuah negara perlu menguasai infrastruktur teknologinya untuk kepentingan militer agar kepentingan negara terjaga dari serangan negara lain.

Konsep ini kemudian berkembang menjadi negara tidak hanya harus menguasai infrastruktur teknologi untuk kepentingan militer, tetapi juga untuk kegiatan ekonomi, kebudayaan, dan lainnya.

Semakin meningkatnya partisipasi rakyat Indonesia memakai teknologi informasi juga menjadi tantangan bagi Pemerintah Indonesia supaya membuat kebijakan berdasarkan kebutuhan rakyatnya.

Partisipasi rakyat yang semakin tinggi dalam teknologi informasi juga meningkatkan risiko kriminalitas dunia maya. Maka, pemerintah perlu juga mempersiapkan kebijakan untuk mengawasi dan menangkal kejahatan internet, seperti hacking, penipuan online, penyadapan, penyebaran rumor secara masif, dan pencurian informasi.

Peta ”cybersuperiority”

Dengan demikian, penting bagi negara mana pun termasuk Indonesia, untuk menguasai informasi dunia maya sekaligus membuat kebijakan berdasarkan kebutuhan rakyatnya. Untuk itu, pemerintah perlu membuat peta cybersuperiority yang terdiri dari tiga jenis lapisan.

Lapisan paling dasar adalah unsur-unsur kenapa dunia maya disebut dunia informasi, yaitu karena kemampuannya mempercepat, mengawasi, menstimulasi, dan menyimpan informasi.

Dengan kata lain, pada lapisan ini yang penting adalah unsur kognitif seperti kecepatan, simulasi, pengawasan, dan penyimpanan.

Lapisan kedua berupa alat-alat atau infrastruktur yang merepresentasikan kecepatan, simulasi, pengawasan, dan penyimpanan informasi. Umumnya, unsur-unsur tersebut adalah perangkat komputer (PC, laptop, kamera, handphone, server), satelit, dan kabel serat optik.

Lapisan ketiga adalah unsur-unsur publik, seperti rakyat, media, perusahaan. Unsur-unsur ini adalah target dari pemanfaatan teknologi informasi untuk kemajuan peradaban bangsa, penyebaran media, dan produktivitas perusahaan.

Dengan membuat peta cybersuperiority, arah kebijakan pemerintah dalam menguasai teknologi informasi untuk kesejahteraan negara menjadi lebih jelas. Lalu, di mana kaitan strategi menguasai teknologi informasi dengan meraih bonus demografi?

Penguasaan teknologi informasi atau cybersuperiority berperan penting untuk mengawal kestabilan negara menuju bonus demografi dan pasca bonus demografi untuk menyerap dan mengakomodasi keinginan rakyat yang tersebar di dunia maya.

Valerian Timothy

Asisten Riset di American Studies Center, Universitas Indonesia

All People Were Very Excited After Coming to See This Seminar!

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On Feb 27th, More than 30 people who attended for seeing American Studies Center’s seminar today were very excited after seeing the seminar. They are mostly academician, professionals, and even students. The topic is about how to maximize 4 technology elements for a better election system. Thanks for Embassy of Canada which has sponsored this seminar, all attendants were very happy because of the topic that is rare, fresh, new, and unique.

The seminar was opened with short speech by

  1. Ms. Suzie Sudarman, M.A, Head of American Studies Center UI
  2. Mr. Huy Nguyen, Political and Public Affairs from Embassy of Canada in Indonesia.
  3. Ms. Reni Suwarso, Ph.D, Center for Election and Political Party FISIP UI.

Attendants were also very happy with the speakers because they are experts in their respected fields:

  • Miss Reni Suwarso, Ph.D, who is expert in young voters,
  • Miss Anisa Santoso, Ph.D, who is experts in UK Electoral Campaign,
  • Miss Yolanda Panjaitan, M.A, who is experts in Technology for Election, and
  • Mr. Soni Subrata, The President Director of Politicawave, who is the man behind Governor Jokowi’s success in social media campaign.

At the end of the session, many people were very grateful with American Studies Center UI and Embassy of Canada.

Finally, we would like to thank you all attendants in this seminar. Please keep supporting us because we will work very hard to deliver the best and exciting seminar in the future.

For more our event coverages, please visit:

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The Trouble with Indonesian Labour: Notes on Recent Struggles of Labour in Post New Order Indonesia.

President Suharto’s authoritarian regime came to an end in 1998. 15 years later, the Indonesian labour movement is still highly fragmented and without real impact on policy-making. In this guest post, Anisa Santoso assesses the current situation of the Indonesian trade unions.

Labour groups and overall socialist concerns in Indonesia gained prominence throughout the country’s struggle for independence and remained evident in the establishment of the country’s first government. Despite this, Indonesian labour is still faced with the struggle to find its place in the social and political spaces of the country. After 32 years of repression under Suharto’s Orde Baru (New Order) regime, labour organisations are losing significance in Indonesian politics. Here we can see how legacies of Indonesia’s authoritarian past, internal divisions within unions, disagreements on radicalism, and conflicting political orientations fuelled by regional segregation in Indonesia have given birth to a labour movement that is disintegrated at the regional level and fragmented within central government politics.

The disintegration of labour started early in Orde Baru. Fear of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)’s vast expansion in the 1960s, followed by claims of a murderous plan of coup d’état, provided reason for the newly elected General Suharto (who became the leader of the Orde Baru) to abolish all components of the party including their connections with radical labour groups. Though this was a reaction typical of Orde Baru state relationship with labour, on the other hand, it nurtured a co-dependent relationship between businesses, politicians and bureaucrats. The business classes’, mostly of Chinese ethnicities, reliance on Javanese majority bureaucrats, and to an extent Sumatran legal officers, created a corporatist group of elites, that actively participates in capital accumulation.

Orde Baru’s increasing gearing towards economic development prioritised the maintenance of stable climate for international investments by restricting labour organisation, a policy backed strongly by the military. While small region based unions were curtailed, more politicised grouping found their leaders imprisoned under the same anti-communism clauses that facilitated PKI’s invalidation. Adding this clause with Orde Baru’s claim to safeguard Indonesian pancasila[i], provided the base to further abolish labour organisations, including SOBSI (The Indonesian Centre of Labour Organisation), the largest labour organisation at the time. With SOBSI out of the picture, the strength of labour movement in Indonesian Orde Baru was crippled. A re-organization of the later day Orde Baru created a state sponsored union, which surviving unionists were forced to join, namely FBSI (Indonesian Workers Federation) which is now known as SPSI (The Indonesian Union of Workers). This trend portrays state and labour interaction in Indonesia before 1998, when de-politicization of labour and staunch control of the government was central.

Although post-Orde Baru brought political reforms accommodative to the working class, contrary to Rueschmeyer’s claims, Indonesian democracy was not a product of the country’s working class (Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Labour groups did kick start the end of Orde Baru, but the groups that provided support for this social movement did not all support working class identities. Tornquist (2004) notes the involvement of marginal intellectual groups, including scholars, journalists and civil society groups as equally significant in the struggle to bring down Orde Baru. In reality, even with sufficient opportunities offered by reformasi, labour groups continue to be relatively insignificant.

 

The institutional disentanglement of Orde Baru led to reformasi that signified a chance for worker activism to blossom. Hundreds of labour strikes occurred between 1999 and 2000 (Tempo 2001), reconfirming the importance of labour’s voice in society. Although post- Orde Baru a number of labour-oriented parties have become influential, e.g the controversial PRD (People’s Democratic Party) and PDI-P (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), one of the biggest opposition of Orde Baru’s Golkar (Functional Group) Party, labour organisations in Indonesia remained marginal to the overall political process.

Indo3

Even though reformasi provided the labour movement a return to the political scene, it also presented Indonesian labour with varying levels of disintegration. The tipping point came when the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) provided support to release imprisoned unionists and create a single national trade-union federation under the SPSI. Perceiving this as subjugation from above, union members challenged it by abandoning SPSI, rejecting its leaders, forming their own unions with some establishing an anti-Orde Baru organisation called SPSI-reformasi. Meanwhile, rifts deepened between existing unions, rooted in their conflicts over association with the Orde Baru. The PPMI (Indonesian Muslim Solidarity Trade Union), for example, is connected to a Suharto founded ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), while GASBIINDO (Amalgamated Islamic Trade Unions of Indonesia) and GASPERMINDO (Amalgamated Islamic Free Trade Unions of Indonesia) has ties to the Orde Baru FBSI (Hadiz 2002). Opposite these are unions that insist on activism and an anti-Orde Baru mind-set, including the Jabotabek Trade Union, JEBAK (Network of Inter—City Workers), PDI-P connected FSPSI (All-Indonesia Labour Union Federation) and the more politically radical, PRD-connected FNPBI (National Front for Indonesian Labour Struggle).

Regional dynamics also contribute to labour disorganisation. The 1999 Decentralisation Law gave greater authority to regional governments on public sector economies and businesses, meaning less control over business-local politics relations. This allows businesses to use ties to local political leaders and political party related militia, including (ironically) PDI-P’s, to suppress unfavourable labour activism (Ford 2001; Aspinall 1999). This signifies less room for labour to develop in regional as well central government politics. Moreover, Orde Baru’s 32 years of Javanese-centric bureaucratic control and repression has resulted in increasing antipathies from other ethnicities, further evoking anti-central government sentiment. Existing Orde Baru institutions and ethnic-centred bureaucracy have also dampened the effort of largely non-Javanese unions in building a more agreeable labour representative at the central government level. This is worsened by regional unions’ lacking technical capacities in comparison to their capital-based counterparts. Consequently, the consolidation of an Indonesian-wide voice of labour has proven insufficient to promote a solid lobby at the central government level.

Another reason for labour’s marginal status in Indonesia is the uncertainty within its efforts at politicization. Despite intentions to develop a grassroots labour movement with a functioning political wing in the government, existing unions have not always viewed unionism as a political tool. Many labour activists “do not see any relations between struggles at the workplace and those over politics” (Tornquist 2004, : p.392), making the establishment of labour parties from existing labour unions difficult. When labour-oriented parties are established, their detachment from union-level activism made them indifferent to the socio-political economic concerns of the grassroots. The outcome to this is worker disassociation from voting for the parties, making recent labour parties such as PBN (National Labour Party) and PRD unsuccessful in gaining favourable governmental position. Furthermore, when some union leaders became a part of the central government, the tendency to forfeit their labour union struggle for the sake of stability becomes considerable.

The Indonesian labour movement has moved far beyond the limitation and oppression of Orde Baru. However, Orde Baru legacies evidently contributed greatly to its recent shortcomings. Internal disagreements and conflicting political orientation made disorganisation rife within existing unions, while the remaining ethnic-specific bureaucratic structure limited their mobility. This suggests that several things need to be present before a more vibrant labour movement can play a significant political role in Indonesia; 1.) the establishment of more favourable institutions for labour inclusion in politics, 2.) better consolidation mechanism for existing unions to engage in party politics, and 3.) better technical capacities for regional unions to gain importance in central government.

References

  • Aspinall, Edward. 1999. Democratisation, the working class and the Indonesian transition. Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 33 (2):1-32.
  • Ford, Michelle. 2001. Challenging the Criteria of Significance: Lessons from Contemporary Indonesian Labour History. Australian Journal of Politics and History 47 (1):101.
  • Hadiz, Vedi R. 2002. The Indonesian Labour Movement: Resurgent or Constrained. In Southeast Asian Affair 2002 edited by D. Singh and A. L. Smith. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asia Studies.
  • Moertopo, Ali. 1972. Some Basic Considerations in 25- Year Development. The Indonesian Quarterly 1 (1):4, 13, 14. 18.
  • Morfit, Michael. 1981. Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government Asian Survey 21 (8):840-841.
  • Rueschmeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago press.
  • Tempo. 2001. Tempo, 30 January-5 February 2001.
  • Tornquist, Olle. 2004. Labour and Democracy? Reflections on the Indonesian Impasse. Journal of Contemporary Asia 34 (3):377-399.

 

About Author

Anisa Santoso successfully completed her Ph.D. thesis on ‘A two level sociological institutionalist critique of migrant workers protection: A state and regional analysis of Indonesia and the Philippines’ in November 2012.

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[i] The Five Principles on Which Indonesian Life is supposed to be based and relying on. The principles includes belief in religion, upholding of justice and civilised humanity, the commitment on the integrity of Indonesia, upholding of consultation and consensus in decision making and a commitment towards social justice in Indonesia.(Moertopo 1972; Morfit 1981).

 

Source: http://andreasbieler.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-trouble-with-indonesian-labour.html